4. Modernizing a Traditional Industry: Bimbo in the Baking Industry by Taeko Hoshino
4. Modernizing a Traditional Industry: Bimbo
in the Baking Industry
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing













4Modernizing a Traditional Industry:
Bimbo in the Baking Industry
The Bimbo Group
Overview of the Group’s Business Activities
Bimbo is not a single enterprise. It is an enterprise group with a holding
company, Grupo Industrial Bimbo, at the top, under which are six business-
firm holding companies which specialize in different business fields. Of the
six second-tier holding companies, the most important ones by amount of
sales are the bread producer Organización Bimbo, and Organización Marinela
which produces pastries, cakes, and cookies. In 1995 these two companies
accounted for 68 per cent of the Bimbo group’s total sales (Grupo Industrial
Bimbo 1996, p. 14), and since the founding of Bimbo, these two have been
central to the group’s business growth. Three new business-firm holding com-
panies were added to the group during the period of economic growth in the
1970s and early 1980s. These were Organización Barcel which produces
snacks like potato chips and corn products, Organización Ricolino produc-
ing candies and chocolates, and Organización Altex for manufacturing raw
materials and machinery and parts. Then Organización Internacional was set
up to oversee the group’s business expansion into Central and South America
and the United States (Grupo Industrial Bimbo 1996, p. 13). Among the many
large-scale indigenous enterprise groups that have been reorganizing and trans-
forming themselves, Bimbo has been in the forefront of multinationalizing
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Fig. 4-1. Location of Bimbo Group Factories and Their Product Lines, 1993
Source: By the author based on data from Grupo Industrial Bimbo (1993).
Notes:
1. State names are in parentheses.
2. The figure shows only the Bimbo group’s most representative factories
which are affiliates of Bimbo, Marinela, Barcel, and Ricolino. Bimbo fac-
tories specialize in bread and tortilla production; Marinela factories in pastry
and cookie production; Barcel factories in the production of snacks; and
Ricolino factories in candy and chocolate production.
business operations. Also during the 1990s the group entered the business of
producing tortillas and ice cream (El Norte, November 2, 1993; January 17,
1994).
Figure 4-1 shows the locations of the Bimbo group’s factories in Mexico
and their product lines. The group has put a good deal of effort into building
up the image of its products through trademarks, and these trademarks have
penetrated deeply into the consumer market. The factories are spread through-
out Mexico, and this is particularly true of the subsidiaries affiliated with the
bread producer, Organización Bimbo. Production bases are spread around
the country because bread is a bulky, easily damaged product which needs to
be produced in the locations it is consumed. And this production network
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covering the whole country has provided the base on which the Bimbo group
has built its monopolistic position in the baking industry.
Table 4-1 summarizes statistical data on Mexico’s baking and other re-
lated industries and provides the number of factories and workers and the
amount of production in these industries. The data is from the 1994 indus-
trial census, but only the data for business areas in which Bimbo operates
have been picked up from the census data in order to compare them with
Bimbo’s own data: namely, bread and cakes, flour milling, cookies and pasta,
chocolates and candies, snacks, and also nixtamal1 and tortilla production.
When the total number of workers and amount of production for all of the
business areas of these industries as a whole (excluding nixtamal and torti-
llas which Bimbo only recently entered) are compared with the number of
employees and sales of the Bimbo group for the same year, the number of
Bimbo employees accounted for 23 per cent of the total number of workers,
and its sales accounted for 26 per cent of the total value of production. These
figures are extremely large for one enterprise group considering that the rela-
tively small share of the group’s production in flour milling, chocolates, can-
dies, and snacks are also included in calculating these figures. Another source
indicated that in 1994 the Bimbo group’s market share for factory-produced
TABLE 4-1
1994 INDUSTRIAL CENSUS DATA ON MEXICO’S BAKING
AND OTHER RELATED INDUSTRIES
      Amount of
Production (Million
                                                  New Pesos)
Bread/cakes (bakery produced) 21,187 85,411 3,155
Bread/cakes (factory produced) 482 25,187 4,987
Flour milling 164 8,646 2,865
Cookies, pasta 1,033 21,297 2,277
Chocolates, candies 878 18,806 2,736
Snacks (potato chips, corn
  products, etc.) 1,945 19,453 4,671
     Total 25,689 178,800 20,691
Nixtamal/tortilla production 41,313 100,858 4,941
Grupo Industrial Bimbo 41,072 5,448
Sources: INEGI (1995, pp. 17–18); BMV (1995, p. 131); Industridata, empresas
grandes (1995, p. 470).
Note: The author could not get the figure for the amount of production of Grupo
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bread was 100 per cent, while it was 60 per cent for cakes and cookies, 25 per
cent for snacks, and 15 per cent for chocolates and candies (El Norte, Janu-
ary 17, 1994).
Looking at the importance of the Bimbo group in the production of staple
foods, Mexico’s two staples are bread and the traditional tortilla. The 1994
industrial census did not have a classification for bread only, meaning that a
comparison of the two cannot be made, so I have used the figures from the
1980 industrial census (INEGI 1988). According to these figures, of the total
national production of tortillas and bread, 43 per cent was for tortillas and 57
per cent for bread, indicating a downtrend in tortilla consumption and a con-
tinuing Westernization of the Mexican diet. Bread producers can be divided
into two types. One is the bakery that makes and sells bread on the same
premises, and according to the 1980 industrial census most of these bakeries
are family-operated businesses employing five workers on average who are
family members and/or employees. The other type of producer is the enter-
prise using the factory system, and Bimbo accounts for most of this produc-
tion (Hoshino 1998, p. 137). In 1980 the proportion of bakery production to
factory production was 55 per cent to 45 per cent. Of the total production of
bread and tortillas, factory-produced bread accounted for 26 per cent, mean-
ing that Bimbo supplied one quarter of the nation’s diet, making it a very
important enterprise group in the country.
Ownership and Management of the Bimbo Group
Bimbo was set up as a family enterprise by a group of related families, and
this section will examine the extent that these families control Bimbo’s own-
ership and management. Data on the structure of ownership is from 1985.
According to the name list of attendees at the general stockholders meeting
for Grupo Industrial Bimbo (held on November 29, 1985), there were at that
time thirteen stockholders who owned 1 per cent or more in stocks; eleven
were corporations and two were individuals. The two individuals were Jaime
Jorba, one of Bimbo’s five founders, and his wife. Of the eleven corpora-
tions, a foursome made up of a commercial bank, two securities companies,
and NAFIN (the government development bank) owned a relatively small
amount of shares that together totaled 13 per cent. The other seven corpora-
tions held the remaining 72 per cent, and of these seven, no less than six were
holding companies financed with capital from the group’s five founders and
their families. At the top of the list of stockholders was Normaciel, a holding
company owned by Lorenzo Servitje, also one of Bimbo’s five founders, his
wife, and eight children. In second place was Grupo Invermat owned by José
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T. Mata, another Bimbo founder, and his wife. Listed fourth and fifth were
Promociones Isona and Promociones Monser, both owned by the above Jaime
Jorba, his wife, and three of his children. Number six listed Distribuidora
Comercial Senda was owned by Jaime Sendra Grimau, another Bimbo
founder, four of his children, and two of his sisters. Eighth listed Worren
Staff was owned by Jaime Jorba, three of his children, and four people from
outside the founding families (RPPCDF, Folio Mercantil, no. 24014, no.
39632, no. 62391, no. 63731, no. 6563). Thus each founding family set up a
holding company, and the stocks owned by each of the families were trans-
ferred to these companies. In this way, at least 72 per cent of Bimbo group
stocks were held by the founders and their families, which includes Jaime
Jorba and his wife as individual stockholders. These holding companies were
set up after 1980 except for Grupo Invermat which was founded in 1962 and
Promociones Monser for which data of its foundation was not available. Grupo
Industrial Bimbo was listed on the stock exchange in 1980 which broke down
the conditions that underpinned the exclusiveness of the founding families
stock ownership. But there still has not been a dispersion of stock ownership,
and it seems that the concentration of stock in holding companies has pre-
vented this.
Looking next at the extent of family control over management, as of 1995
Roberto Servitje, the younger brother of Lorenzo, was head of the board of
directors and president of Grupo Industrial Bimbo. Lorenzo had headed the
board of directors until 1994 and had been president until 1992, but he with-
drew gradually from Bimbo’s management and handed both positions over
to Roberto. The decision making, executive and supervisory operations of
the Bimbo group are carried out by the board of directors with the approval
from the general stockholders meeting. In 1994 the board of directors of
Grupo Industrial Bimbo consisted of twelve members, three of whom were
Lorenzo, Roberto, and Jaime Jorba, and another four who were members of
the founding families (BMV 1995, p. 130). In other words, the majority of
the board of directors was from the founding families, meaning that ultimate
decision-making authority over group operations was held by these families.
However, business operations at the level of the business-firm holding com-
panies and below employed a wide range of management personnel from
outside of the founding families. In 1994 the general directors of four of the
six business-firm holding companies were from the founding families, but
below these at the level of the business firms, all of the firms’ general direc-
tors were from outside the founding families (Industridata, empresas grandes
1995). In other words, the highest levels of group operations were held by
founding family members, but lower down at the level of the business firms,
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the Bimbo group had hired a wide range of salaried managerial personnel
from outside the founding families.
The above overview indicates that the majority of the stockholdings and
the top levels of decision making in the Bimbo group are still held by mem-
bers of the founding families, meaning that the group’s status as an enter-
prise run by its founding families remains unchanged. However, considering
the concentration of founding family stockholdings in family holding com-
panies and the active hiring of salaried managers from outside, changes are
taking place in ownership and management. The rapid growth of the Bimbo
group has compelled these changes.
Growth of the Bimbo Group
Background of the Founding Families
The Bimbo group arose from the enterprise Panificación Bimbo estab-
lished in 1944. To understand how this company came into being, we need to
look back at the history of the founding families.
Bimbo was set up by five men from related families who were the sons of
immigrants who had come to Mexico from the Catalonia region of Spain. It
seems that a lot of bakeries have been set up by the descendants of immi-
grants who have come over from Spain since Mexico’s independence, and
Bimbo’s founding families are among them. The first family member to im-
migrate seems to have been José Torrallardona who arrived in Mexico City
and opened a bakery called La Flor de México. After the bakery had become
established, he provided support for a succession of relatives who came over
to Mexico from Spain. Among these were the parents of the Servitje broth-
ers. They immigrated to Mexico in 1914 and worked for a time at La Flor de
México. Then in 1928 they set up their own business, a bakery-cum-restau-
rant called El Molino. This business grew steadily, and it continues to oper-
ate today as a chain of bakeries in Mexico City. Following his father’s death
in 1936, son Lorenzo Servitje helped his mother run the business. But in
1944 together with his brother-in-law, Jaime Jorba, Lorenzo opened up a
new business using funds collected from relatives. The new business used
factory-style production to make bread. The new company was named
Panificación Bimbo which ultimately gave rise to the Bimbo group (Sendra
de Servitje n.d.).
The fact that the founders of the new company were the sons of immi-
grants from Spain is significant for the founding of Bimbo and its subse-
quent development. The reason for selecting the bread baking business was
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because of this immigrant background. Their business was the continuation
and further development of their parents’ business. Their parents had selected
this line of business because, given the amount of funds and level of skills
needed, it was easy for Spanish immigrants to enter. Also they did not com-
pete with Mexican nationals because the bread baking business was not so
popular within the local population. Another significance in their immigrant
status is that they came over to Mexico as families looking for a new life, and
were enthusiastic about their new business. Moreover, they frequently went
to Europe and the United States, and their wide range of movement made it
possible for them to find opportunities for new businesses.
Bimbo’s Expansion since 1944
As already stated, the beginnings of the Bimbo group go back to a bread
manufacturer set up in 1944 in Mexico City. The company was established
with capital of 300,000 pesos (RPPCDF, Sección Comercio, Libro 3, Vol.
190, Fojas 136, Asiento 64 [hereafter: C-3-190-136-64]), equal to 62,000
U.S. dollars at the then prevailing exchange rate. A number of the investors
were involved in foreign trade, and the funding for the new company came
from this foreign trading and from the savings of two bakeries started by
predecessors. The company began with one factory, thirty-seven workers,
and a fleet of eleven delivery trucks, and its chief market was in Mexico City.
Bimbo’s business steadily increased, and in 1947, three years after its es-
tablishment, the company built a second factory on the same site as the first
to cope with the expanding demand; then in 1952 it built a third factory (Pan,
January 1959, p. 28). In 1954 Bimbo began to diversify, setting up a subsid-
iary, Pasteles y Biscochos (present-day Productos Marinela), in Mexico City
to produce pastries and cookies. In 1956 it set up a subsidiary to produce
bread in Guadalajara, Mexico’s second largest city. This was the first step in
the geographical expansion of its production network. Since then the group’s
network has continued to expand with factories set up in the states of
Monterrey (1960), Sonora (1966), and Veracruz (1970). To keep stock own-
ership of the growing number of subsidiaries concentrated in founding fam-
ily hands, a holding company, Promoción de Negocios, the predecessor of
Grupo Industrial Bimbo, was set up in 1966. The expansion of production
facilities into Guadalajara had been for the purpose of opening up a new
market. But the expansion of Bimbo’s production network thereafter was in
response to growing demand. Factories in Mexico City and Guadalajara had
been able to supply bread to the northern states, but when the capacities of
these production facilities became saturated, the factory in Monterrey was
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built. The factory in Veracruz was built to take over from the factories in
Mexico City which had been supplying that region (Pan, July 1957, pp. 19–
22; April 1966, pp. 18–20).
During the latter half of the 1970s, in the wake of the oil boom, the Bimbo
group’s expansion accelerated, and development moved ahead in two areas:
geographical expansion and product diversification. In the area of geographical
expansion, Bimbo subsidiaries for bread production were established in the
states of Guanajuato (1976), Tabasco (1978), Sinaloa (1981), and Chihuahua
(1982). In pastry and cookie production, subsidiaries of Marinela were set up
in the states of Jalisco and Aguascalientes in 1976 (Industridata, empresas
grandes 1986). In the area of product diversification, the group moved into
the production of snacks in 1979, and candies and chocolates in 1980, and
subsidiaries for these new product lines were set up in Durango state and
Mexico City. Also during this time (although the data does not specify the
date) a subsidiary producing marmalade was set up in Michoacán state.
The Bimbo group’s expansion continued even during Mexico’s economic
crisis of the 1980s. In 1986 it bought up Continental de Alimentos, the former
Mexican subsidiary of ITT Continental Baking Co., the largest bread manu-
facturer in the United States. When ITT first moved into Mexico in 1959, it
tried to buy up Bimbo. However, the founding families refused to sell, and
this led to fierce competition between the two companies during the 1960s
(Derrosi 1977, pp. 358–59). Then ITT withdrew, and Continental de Alimentos
continued to operate in a merger that turned it over to a Mexican entrepre-
neur. With the absorption of this long-standing rival, there were no more
strong competitors left in the market. Then in 1988 Tía Rosa Suandy, a sub-
sidiary specializing in homemade-style cookies, was set up. Thereafter the
production networks of the group’s existing product lines were further aug-
mented while Bimbo also entered the new fields of ice cream and tortilla
production and began to expand its business overseas.
As this overview shows, from the time of its establishment right up to the
present, Bimbo has experienced uninterrupted growth. The next section will
look at the factors that made this remarkable growth possible.
The Factors behind Bimbo’s Growth
Three things can be pointed to as the main factors for the Bimbo group’s
growth: the expansion of demand, an appropriate business strategy, and the
character of the industry’s technology.
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Expansion of Demand
The spread geographically of Bimbo’s production network was wholly in
response to demand, meaning that the growth in demand for bread contrib-
uted greatly to the growth of Bimbo. This point can be shown clearly using
the population census figures.
The tortilla, made from corn and wheat, has long been Mexico’s tradi-
tional staple food. But with the Westernization of the Mexican diet, the torti-
lla has gradually been replaced by bread. Table 4-2 shows the population
figures for bread and non-bread consumption from the 1950, 1960, and 1970
population censuses. The 1970 census figures treated the population under
one year in age differently than did the two earlier censuses, so a strict com-
parison cannot be made. But even if the figures were treated the same, no big
differences would arise; thus whether looked at in absolute or relative terms,
it is clear that the bread consuming portion of the population grew rapidly.
With the 1980 census, bread was no longer included as one of the indices for
tracking change in the national diet; instead meat, eggs, and milk were used.
This indicates that bread has now been incorporated as part of the Mexican
diet. Looking at bread consumption by state, it is high in Jalisco, Sonora, and
Veracruz where Bimbo expanded its operations between 1956 and 1970. It
was this rapidly expanding bread consumption and Bimbo’s energetic efforts
to develop the market in those regions with high concentrations of bread
consumers that lay behind the company’s steadily expanding growth.
While expanding demand was essential for Bimbo’s growth, it does not
explain why the company was able to establish its dominance in the industry.
Expanding demand gives other companies as well the opportunity to grow.
TABLE 4-2
GROWTH OF BREAD CONSUMPTION IN MEXICO, 1950–70
                                                                                                 (1,000 people)
1950 25,791 814 24,977 13,593 (54) 11,384 (46)
1960 34,923 1,144 33,779 23,160 (69) 10,619 (31)
1970 48,377 — 48,377 37,046 (77) 11,331 (23)
Sources: By the author based on data from Pan (May 1956, p. 31; January 1970,
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 Eat Bread       Do Not Eat Bread(1) (3)
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During the 1960s, in fact, Bimbo was vying with two strong competitors,
Alimentos Internacionales and the previously mentioned Continental de
Alimentos. Ultimately Bimbo was able to buy up both, the former during the
1970s and the latter in 1986. This ability to grow and surpass even a foreign-
owned enterprise can be regarded as another factor demonstrating the appro-
priateness of Bimbo’s business strategy.
Appropriate Business Strategy
Bimbo’s business strategy has distinguished itself in its emphasis on se-
curing raw materials, augmenting the group’s delivery system, diversifying
products, and vigorously using trademarks and advertising. The first and third
were also effected by government policies.
1.  Securing raw materials and augmenting the delivery system
To assure smooth production to meet increasing demand, it is essential to
secure a stable supply of raw materials, and Bimbo put a great deal of effort
into this area. One example was its involvement in wheat production during
the 1950s. During the 1950s and 1960s wheat production changed greatly
under the impact of the “green revolution” and government policy to expand
production in Mexico’s northwest. Public investment in large-scale irriga-
tion works, the introduction of high-yielding varieties, the use of fertilizer
and agricultural chemicals, and the mechanization of farming all brought
about a rapid increase in the volume of wheat production. But these changes
in production methods changed the quality of the wheat. The problem for
Bimbo was that the gluten content of the wheat decreased which reduced the
quality of its bread. To counter this problem Bimbo began to cooperate in
1955 with fertilizer companies and flour mills to promote the production of
wheat high in gluten. It began a program directed at using fertilizers and
improved wheat varieties, and for farmers who cooperated with its program
Bimbo guaranteed high prices for purchasing their wheat. This effort of work-
ing with farmers succeeded in raising the gluten content of the wheat, and
Bimbo thereby assured for itself this most essential raw material (Pan, De-
cember 1972, p. 117).
Another factor that has promoted Bimbo’s growth was the continuous aug-
mentation of its system for delivering its products. Bimbo began its business
with 11 delivery trucks, as already mentioned. Thereafter it invested large
amounts in delivery equipment, especially when it set up new subsidiaries.
When it expanded its operations to Jalisco state in 1956, for example, it pur-
chased 60 trucks. In 1959 the Bimbo group as a whole owned about 200
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trucks. In 1960 when it started operations in Sonora state, it purchased 50
trucks (Pan, July 1957, p. 22; January 1959, p. 28; April 1960, p. 23). As of
1981 the Bimbo group was delivering its products to around 120,000 shops
throughout the country. If the Bimbo group’s delivery system is broken down
into its individual affiliated product groupings, the affiliates belonging to the
Bimbo bread manufacturing group had 2,300 routes, the Marinela group had
1,800 routes, the Barcel group 800 routes, the Ricolino group 400 routes,
and Tía Rosa Suandy with 150 routes, a total of 5,450 routes (Expansión,
December 9, 1981, pp. 93–94). Bread is an easily damaged product that has
to reach consumers soon after production. And because it is a staple, the
whole population is a potential market. Through its efforts to build up a huge
fleet of delivery vehicles and a delivery network that stretches over the whole
country, Bimbo has succeeded in turning its potential market into its actual
market.
2.  Product diversification
Two important events stand out in the history of Bimbo’s product diver-
sification, both having great significance. The first was the start of produc-
tion in pastries with the establishment of Pasteles y Biscochos in 1954. This
event meant more than just an increase in the number of Bimbo’s products; it
was a move into a line of bakery that was not affected by government price
controls. The price of bread was essentially controlled by the government,
although only two types of bread, borillo and terela, were actually subject to
price controls. Profits from these two bread types were low, so producers
made up for the low profits by producing pastries. Bread baked in loaves,
which was the type Bimbo produced in its factories, was not subject to price
controls, but because it was a product that competed with price-controlled
bread, these controls had an indirect effect on the price that Bimbo could
charge for its bread. By moving into the production of pastries, Bimbo was
able to overcome this restriction.
The second important event took place around 1980 with Bimbo’s move
into the production of non-bread products, especially snacks, candies, and
chocolates, and the start of homemade-style cookie production with the es-
tablishment of Tía Rosa Suandy. It was noted earlier that by 1980 bread had
become part of the national diet which meant that Bimbo could no longer
look forward to the continued extensive growth of this market. Therefore it
had to start cultivating its existing market more intensively through the suc-
cessive introduction of non-bread products that held promise for the future.
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3. The vigorous use of trademarks and advertising
Each of the product groupings within the Bimbo group has its own trade-
mark, such as the little bear for the Bimbo bread group, the little maiden for
the Marinela group, and the squirrel for the Barcel group. These trademarks
are used right from the time a group product appears on the market, and over
the many years they have become established in the minds of consumers
which has helped create an affection for the products. Advertising has played
an important role in establishing these trademarks. Since the time of its found-
ing Bimbo has advertised its products via the whole gamut of media from
newspaper and magazine advertisements, pamphlets and flyers, and trade
fair displays, to TV spot advertisements and sponsorships of popular TV
programs (Pan, June 1963, p. 27; March 1966, pp. 25–26; Expansión, De-
cember 9, 1981, pp. 97, 99); and arguably the change of staple food in the
Mexican diet from the tortilla to bread (which includes manufactured loafed
bread) was not wholly a natural occurrence, but also the result of mass adver-
tising carried on by manufacturers.
The Character of the Industry’s Technology
The technology of bread making is comparatively simple and dates back
to B.C. times. The basic technique of adding water and yeast to wheat flour
and mixing them, letting the dough rise, then baking remains largely un-
changed to this day. The uncomplicated character of this technology made it
possible for Bimbo to master the latest international techniques of bread
making within a short period of time. A good example of Bimbo’s efforts to
introduce the latest technology took place at the time the company was
founded. This was the very favorable offer they gave to Alfonso Verazco, a
graduate of a bakers school in Chicago and who was the first Mexican baker
to be trained in the United States. Verazco was presented with one share of
stock from the 300 shares issued at the time of Bimbo’s founding. This one
share was called a labor share, and as stipulated in the company’s statute of
incorporation, this share was nontransferable and by owning it Verazco was
to receive 10 per cent of net profits during the time he worked with Bimbo on
condition that he cooperated with Bimbo only and no other company, and
then for five years after leaving Bimbo he was to receive 5 per cent of net
profits on condition that during that time he did not engage in the same sort
of work he had provided Bimbo (RPPCDF, C-3-190-136-64). This one ex-
ample shows how Bimbo paid large amounts to acquire the most up-to-date
technology of the time and then worked to monopolize its use. The company
has continued to follow this path, and when setting up new factories, it al-
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ways seeks to bring in the latest in automated technology and mass produc-
tion equipment (Pan, July 1957, p. 22; January 1959, p. 28; April 1960, p.
21). The continual introduction of the latest technology has been an integral
part of Bimbo’s business strategy, and the company’s ability to keep up with
the latest techniques has been greatly facilitated by the basically uncompli-
cated character of the industry’s technology.
Concluding Remarks: The Modernizing of a Traditional Industry
It is evident from the above analysis that the Bimbo group’s steady growth
over the decades has been due in large part to its business strategy. The no-
table points of this strategy have been the efforts to make use of the latest
technologies, to maintain a well-equipped distribution system, to make vig-
orous use of trademarks and advertising, and the company’s involvement in
the agricultural sector to assure a supply of raw materials. In these points
Bimbo’s strategy has been much like that of Cuauhtémoc analyzed in Chap-
ter 2. A further similarity is that the strategy both companies adopted was
that of American food companies. This aimed at consolidating the company’s
hold on the market and expanding it into a monopolistic enterprise (Connor
and others 1985).2
Commenting on the rise of the modern enterprise and the requisites for its
growth, the business historian Alfred D. Chandler said that during the second
industrial revolution that took place in the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury, a large number of new industries were created and many old ones trans-
formed by major innovations in manufacturing. The new methods and pro-
cesses differed from the previous ones in that they greatly increased the
possibility for unprecedented comparative advantage on production cost
through economies of scale and scope. In order to enjoy such cost-based
advantage, companies would seek to invest in large-scale production facili-
ties, in nationwide and international distribution networks, and in manage-
ment. Enterprises that were ahead of the others in carrying out this three-
pronged investment in production, distribution, and management acquired a
dominant competitive position, and industries where such enterprises oper-
ated became oligopolistic with a small number of “first movers” coming to
prevail in the industry. Among the new manufacturing methods and processes
mentioned by Chandler were those for refining and distilling whisky and
other liquids, and mechanical processing and packaging of grains, tobacco,
and other agricultural products (Chandler 1990, pp. 8, 23). Chandler’s argu-
ment pertained to enterprises in the advanced capitalist countries, but it can
be used to explain the growth of Bimbo as well. Bimbo’s success in over-
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coming the competition of its American rival was because when the latter
entered the Mexican market intent upon employing a modern business strat-
egy for securing a dominant position in the industry, Bimbo had already
mastered that strategy and had solidified its position as the “first mover” in
the industry.
To successfully adopt this business strategy and achieve its remarkable
growth, Bimbo had to have first-rate human resources and an abundant sup-
ply of funds. Had the founding families persisted in monopolizing owner-
ship and management, Bimbo’s growth would have been hemmed in by limi-
tations on human resources and capital funding. But the families handled
both of these areas with skill and flexibility. From the earliest years of the
company, salaried managerial personnel were brought in as part of the man-
agement (some examples are Pan, July 1957, p. 22; January 1959, p. 28;
April 1960, p. 23), although ultimate authority over decision making always
remained in the hands of the founding families. On this point Bimbo differed
greatly from Chandler’s description of the modern enterprise in the advanced
countries where even the top levels of management include salaried manag-
ers. On the matter of ownership, until the listing of the holding companies on
the stock exchange in 1980, the Bimbo group’s stocks were held exclusively
by the founding families. Funding for business expansion was obtained from
the group’s internal reserves and through loans from domestic financial or-
ganizations (RPPCDF, C-4-57-384-399, C-4-74-346-311, C-4-75-54-699, C-
4-82-250-220, C-4-89-406-355,C-4-96-48-49, C-4-111-354-350, C-4-120-
101-118, C-4-129-346-558). But during the rapid economic growth of the oil
boom period, the group’s traditional sources were unable to provide the large
amounts of funds needed, and one means of overcoming this limitation was
to go public and list stocks of the group’s holding companies on the ex-
change. This move broke down the founding families’ exclusive ownership,
but having set up a number of holding companies and through the concentra-
tion of founding families’ stockholdings, these families were able to prevent
a loss of managerial rights from a dispersion of stocks and an outflow of
shares from their ranks.
Notes
1 Nixtamal is a corn paste which is formed into tortillas.
2 This source makes a case study of the Bimbo rival ITT Continental Baking
Company and its growth into a monopolistic enterprise in the United States.
